Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 22

Issue 2

Article 2

2017

Bringing Talent Off the Bench and into the Game: The
Underrepresentation of Women in the Boardroom
Rachel Orbach
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2017

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business and Corporate
Communications Commons, and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rachel Orbach, Bringing Talent Off the Bench and into the Game: The Underrepresentation of Women in
the Boardroom, 22 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 203 (2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol22/iss2/2

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

BRINGING TALENT OFF THE BENCH AND INTO
THE GAME: THE UNDERREPRESENTATION OF
WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM
Rachel Orbach*
While women have expanded their footprint in corporate America in
recent years, they are still underrepresented in the upper echelons of
corporate governance, specifically in boardrooms, which dictate the
direction of a company. At the current rate, it will take more than
four decades before women’s representation on corporate boards
reaches parity with that of men. Women face obstacles that make it
difficult to rise in the ranks of corporate America. This can be
attributed to numerous factors that collectively burden women with
expectations that are at odds with success. These factors include low
representation of women in traditional pipelines to board seats, lack
of flexibility in the workplace, male-driven work cultures, and
disproportionate mentorship and sponsorship opportunities.
Why should companies care about diversity? The importance of
diversity can be reinforced by both business and moral arguments.
The business case highlights the value-maximizing effect of diverse
boards while the moral arguments emphasize that gender diversity is
the “right thing to do.” However, despite these arguments in favor of
gender diversity, the efforts to improve diversity on boards have
been lacking. This Note highlights the current landscape and
suggests ways to break down barriers to increase women’s
representation in the boardroom. A balanced boardroom with more
women’s perspectives will lead to an improved understanding of a
company’s stakeholders and its customers’ needs. Increased
diversity can also enhance a board’s ability to meet its fiduciary
duties.

* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2017; B.A. Linguistics & Jewish
Studies, Emory University, 2013. The author would like to thank Professor Caroline
Gentile for her guidance throughout the development of this Note, Professor Richard
Squire for the Note topic, and all of the staff on the Fordham Journal of Corporate and
Financial Law for their input. All errors are the author’s own. This Note would not have
been possible without the support and encouragement of the author’s family and
friends.
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INTRODUCTION
The Oracle of Omaha, Warren Buffett, has said his success is partly
due to the fact that he only needed to compete with half the population.1
Unfortunately, when surveying the landscape of corporate America, it
appears that, as is generally the case, Buffett is correct in his assessment.
While women continue to outpace men in educational achievement, this
has not translated to increased representation of women in the corporate
sphere, as evident by the lack of diversity in boardrooms.
Women face numerous obstacles in their rise to senior positions.
Firstly, it is challenging for women to attain board positions when the
prerequisite is often experience in a senior management position, a level
at which they already face significant underrepresentation. Secondly, the
workplace has failed to accommodate mothers and provide the
flexibility that they need in balancing child rearing and their
professional lives. This has enabled the creation of a class of dependent
women who adjust their careers to accommodate their spouses, further
enabling men to continue to dominate the public sphere. Motherhood
triggers assumptions that women are less committed to their jobs and are
therefore less qualified. While women and men both practice work-life
balance, they do not share the same burdens because typically, women
disproportionately bear the costs of having a family.
Furthermore, the male-driven culture is a hindrance to women’s
success as they face pressure to conform to established male norms.
Women and men are biologically different, and there are cultural norms
and stereotypes to which each gender is expected to conform. If women
stray from what is expected, it hurts their chances of success. The maledominant corporate culture only reinforces this notion by appointing
male directors who will “fit in” with the status quo.
Moreover, the “glass ceiling” that caps women’s success also
prevents highly successful women from reaching positions where they
are able to receive the proper mentorship and sponsorship opportunities
that men have. In the unlikely event that women do receive such
mentorship, the advice is usually skewed by unexamined mindsets in the
workforce or lacks the proper direction. For the first time in American
history, single women outnumber married women. This has significant
ramifications, as there are a greater number of women who are
1.

SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK AND THE WILL TO LEAD 6 (2013).
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independent and the workforce will presumably need to adjust
accordingly. However, the extent to which single women will stimulate
change depends on women stepping up to call for the progress they
desire.
Where women are represented in boardrooms, certain patterns have
emerged. A lack of a “critical mass” of women hinders their ability to
have their voices heard. Moreover, there is a pattern of boards
appointing one “trophy” woman to multiple boards, creating the illusion
that companies care about diversity and inclusiveness, when in reality,
companies are recycling the same women. In other cases, corporations
fail to find the lack of diversity in board positions problematic and
therefore do not prioritize remedying the issue at all.
Why should companies care about diversity? Diversity is important
because investors care about the equity returns in their companies
(which are affected by board heterogeneity), and the concept of the
“business case” is in line with their investment agendas. Another
argument is a moral argument, which states that diversity is important
because it is simply the “right thing to do.” Appointing more women on
boards would be a more accurate reflection of society and signal to
consumers the value companies place on equal representation.
While initiatives to improve diversity on boards exist, these efforts
have fallen short. Overall, there is an absence of legislation on the state
level. However, there have been some voluntary approaches aimed at
setting target numbers of women on boards. Regulation S-K, put forth
by the SEC, mandates disclosure of a company’s board composition, but
the law is more suggestive than compulsory in nature and has yet to
yield significant change. Compared to countries around the world that
have taken a more hard-line approach by instituting mandatory quotas,
the United States lags behind in increasing gender equality on boards.
This Note highlights the current landscape and suggests ways to
break down barriers to increase women’s representation in the
boardroom. While this Note calls for more women on boards, it is not an
invitation to hand out board seats to women. There is a need for women
to achieve their rightful positions because of their qualifications, and not
solely for the sake of diversity. A balanced boardroom with more
women’s perspectives will lead to an improved understanding of a
company’s stakeholders and its customers’ needs, and allow directors to
adeptly perform their roles as fiduciaries to the corporation.
Part I of this Note provides background on the board of directors’
role in a corporation and the current status of women’s representation in
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boardrooms, highlights the barriers women face in rising to higher
ranks, and analyzes why diversity matters. Part II describes recent U.S.
efforts to improve diversity, including both state- and federal-level
initiatives. Lastly, Part III outlines some concrete suggestions for
improving diversity on boards moving forward.
I . BACKGROUND
A. DIRECTORS
1. The Role of Corporate Boards
The board of directors plays a crucial role in a corporation’s
decision-making process.2 Given its role as the corporation’s strategic
leader, the board of directors is often considered the “epicenter of U.S.
corporate governance.”3 The board’s role is determined by state statutes,
which safeguard the board of director’s management of the
corporation’s affairs.4 Directors are responsible for developing strategies
through problem solving and critical analysis. According to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Principles
of Corporate Governance, “[t]he corporate governance framework
should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability
to the company and the shareholders.”5
The corporate structure lends itself to a separation of ownership and
control, whereby one group—the directors—controls the corporation,
and another group—the stakeholders—provides the capital. 6 This

2. Rajeev Gupta, The Pursuit of Diversity in the Boardroom, EXECRANK,
https://execrank.com/board-of-directors-articles/pursuit-diversity-boardroom/ [https://
perma.cc/NXE8-XJ7S] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
3. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 51 (2008).
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2016).
5. ORGANISATION OF ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., G-20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/g20-oecdprinciples-of-corporate-governance-2015_9789264236882-en [https://perma.cc/9RKJQCGC].
6. Kose John & Lemma W. Senbet, Corporate Governance and Board
Effectiveness, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 371, 372-373 (1998).
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separation of ownership and control inherent in a corporation gives rise
to potential conflicts between the corporation’s stakeholders and
directors. 7 Corporate governance is a set of practices and rules that
handles this conflict. 8 Given the directors’ responsibility to guide the
corporation and guard company assets, they would be prudent to
implement the principles critical to good corporate governance, one of
which is the board’s duty to monitor.9 The monitoring role is important
because corporate ownership is often dispersed, which makes it
challenging for shareholders to effectively monitor director behavior.10
Therefore, it is the directors’ job to serve as the shareholders’ guardian
and engage in effective risk oversight and crisis management. Directors
must foresee challenges that lie ahead and apply their expertise to help
their companies navigate such obstacles. In a constantly shifting
business landscape, boards must be progressive in order for their
companies to maintain a competitive position.11
Due to shareholders’ lack of control over a corporation’s ordinary
business operations and their need to rely on directors and officers to
manage the corporation, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to
the shareholders.12 Fiduciary duties are a feature of state law and include
7.
8.
9.

Id. This conflict creates an “agency problem.” Id.
Id.
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Important Work of
Boards of Directors (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/important-workof-boards-of-directors.html [https://perma.cc/2RWA-7L6D]. Cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (stating that “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate
governance . . . are highly desirable, often tend to benefit stockholders, [and] sometimes
reduce litigation . . . [b]ut they are not required by the corporation law and do not define
standards of liability”).
10. Large corporations especially have a problem with the monitoring duty because
their ownership is typically even more distributed. John & Senbet, supra note 6, at 372.
As a result, individual shareholders do not have enough interest to validate spending
time and money to monitor managers and instead rely on others’ efforts to do so. Id.
11. Two-thirds of directors surveyed in a 2014 Spencer Stuart survey agree that
boards need to be savvy and believe that board turnover is “important” or “critically
important.” Steven A. Rosenblum, Karessa L. Cain & Sebastian V. Niles, NYSE:
Corporate Governance Guide, NYSE (Dec. 2014), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/
nyse/listing/NYSE_Corporate_Governance_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/57VQ-6HK3]
[hereinafter Corp. Guide]; Aguilar, supra note 9.
12. See Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the
CNMV Corporate Governance and Securities Markets Conference (Feb. 8, 2007), https:
//www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch020807rcc.htm [https://perma.cc/XQQ9-E7J5].
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the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.13 Under the shareholder primacy
model, the board’s central role is to maximize shareholder wealth.14 To
fulfill their duties, loyal and prudent directors should maximize longterm value creation for the company.15 Shareholders sometimes contest
the board’s corporate decisions, such as a decision to make charitable
contributions. 16 However, corporate statutes allow directors to use
corporate profits for corporate donations and social goals.17 Charitable
giving provides a means for a company to create a benevolent image,
maintain a devoted customer-base, and can be an advantageous tax
strategy.18
Fiduciary duties provide recourse for shareholders when the
directors’ actions run contrary to the goal of maximizing company
profits or are not in the best interests of the corporation.19 Specifically,
13. There is also the duty of good faith, which is a component of the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (West 2016)
(disallowing limitation of liability for duty of care violations resulting from bad-faith
actions); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)
(holding that the failure to act in good faith is a factor considered when evaluating a
potential breach of the duty of loyalty).
14. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (expressing the
position that profits should be managers’ primary goal); see also AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a)
(1994) (“[A] corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”).
15. See TIAA-CREF POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (6th ed.
2011), http://www1.tiaacref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp/documents/docu
ment/tiaa01007871.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVB3-HLRU]. Companies often overemphasize the short-term financial outcomes. According to a March 2014 McKinsey
and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board survey, 47% of 604 executives and
directors from around the world said their companies’ boards overemphasized
immediate financial outcomes and 74% of those who were currently directors took the
responsibility themselves. Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Where Boards Fall
Short, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/01/where-boards-fallshort [https://perma.cc/GSG4-QTR5].
16. John A. Pearce II, The Rights of Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate
Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 251, 252 (2015).
17. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733, 763 (2005).
18. Pearce II, supra note 16, at 252.
19. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682 (finding that the director and controlling
shareholder, Henry Ford, subordinated shareholder interests to those of the customers
by not paying dividends).
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shareholders can bring a derivative claim when the board breaches its
fiduciary duties.20 In many cases, directors have the protection of the
business judgment rule, a safe harbor that provides deferential treatment
to directors.21 Courts give directors some latitude to use their expertise
in making business decisions, overlooking losses that may have
occurred as a result of managerial decisions made by an officer or
director in good faith.22
2. Board Size and Director Terms
Corporate boards have the freedom and flexibility to pick the
individual board members and set limitations on the size of the board.
State statutes require directors to be elected annually,23 but the board
may also be staggered into thirds, should the company choose to do so.24
Term limits vary from company to company: in 2014, only 3% of
boards of S&P 500 companies stipulated director term limits, and the
average term for a director for all boards was 8.4 years. 25 Another
method boards have adopted to stimulate board refreshment is the
establishment of mandatory retirement ages for its directors.26 In 2014,
73% of S&P 500 boards had formal policies regarding board member

20. A breach of fiduciary duty can include inadequately informed decisions, selfdealing, failure to monitor, deliberate malice, illegal acts, the taking of an opportunity
that belongs to the principal, and interference with the shareholders’ right to vote. See,
e.g., Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch.
2003), Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11132, 2000 WL 710199 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000);
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., No. CIV. A. 9720, 1988 WL 909333 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15,
1988); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
21. See Ashley Schoenjahn, Note, New Faces of Corporate Responsibility: Will
New Entity Forms Allow Businesses to Do Good?, 37 J. CORP. L. 453, 456 (2012).
22. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 111. This rule prevents courts from finding
directors at fault if they relied on “any rational business purpose” when making their
decision. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (West 2016).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2016).
25. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 72-73; SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2014,
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/pdf%20files/research%20and%20insight%20p
dfs/ssbi2014web14nov2014.pdf%20target= [https://perma.cc/GG93-E2ED].
26. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 48.
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retirement age.27 The number of individuals on the board also varies by
organization, usually depending on the size and scope of the company.
According to a 2014 survey of public companies, the average board size
was about ten directors, with larger companies having more directors.28
3. Board Committees
The board of directors typically creates individual committees to
enhance oversight effectiveness and delegate board responsibilities. 29
The allocation of responsibilities among these committees ensures
effective corporate governance and enables the committees to focus on
particular issues that may be too large or complex for the entire board;
thus, the committees offer input on significant matters, guarantee that
the board’s work is informed, and recommend policies subject to the
entire board’s approval.30 The three most fundamental board committees
are the compensation committee, the audit committee, and the
nominating and governance committee. 31 The number of committees
and their members varies by company, and boards have the freedom to
select the size and individual members of each committee.32 The number
27. Id. at 73. About half of the directors noted that there is a compulsory retirement
age on their boards. Id. at 48.
28. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2015, https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/
pdf%20files/research%20and%20insight%20pdfs/ssbi-2015_110215-web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4VV6-FZSG]; see also David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Gender
Diversity on Boards: The Future is Almost Here, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 24, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/25
/gender-diversity-on-boards-the-future-is-almost-here/ [https://perma.cc/B48G-HDRM]
(stating that large firms tend to have larger boards).
29. These committees are permitted by state statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(c) (West 2016).
30. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 91.
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN INCLUDE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (Dec.
2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674008.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7ZC-6HYF]
[hereinafter GAO Report]. Companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are
required to have these three committees. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 102.
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (West 2016). Companies may have other
committees depending on necessity and the industry. Other board committees include
finance, fundraising, product development, promotion and sales, public relations,
research, environmental, safety, and programming. Derick Hughes, The Changing Face
of Nomination Committees Globally, ETHICAL BOARDROOM (Feb. 17, 2014), http://ethic
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of women on each of these fundamental board committees is roughly
indicative of women’s representation on boards generally.33
Although state law dictates director responsibilities, it typically
does not require director independence.34 In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (“SOX”) was enacted to improve disclosure and financial reporting;
although it did not expressly address board composition, SOX mandated
the presence of an entirely independent audit committee. 35 The New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) guidelines took a broader approach by
requiring its listed companies to have a majority of independent
directors on their boards. 36 The NYSE guidelines define independent
directors as those with “no material relationship with the company,
either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization
that has a relationship with the company.”37 The rules specifically forbid
certain subsets from being considered independent: individuals who
have a significant financial stake in the company, individuals related to
top executives, and employees who are only three years removed from
the company.38
alboardroom.com/leadership/changing-face-nomination-committees-globally/ [https://
perma.cc/FKX4-5TJ6].
33. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 28.
34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2016); Theo Francis & Joann S.
Lublin, Boards Get More Independent But Ties Endure, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/boards-get-more-independent-but-ties-endure-1453234607
[https://perma.cc/SR2R-CYQR] (“[F]ederal law requires board committees overseeing
executive pay or company audits to include only independent directors.”).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012); Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Board Diversity: The 21st Century Challenge: “The New Regulatory Climate
and Impact on Board Composition” (Nov. 11, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch111105cag.htm [https://perma.cc/3QGX-4ZFT] [hereinafter Glassman Speech].
36. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2013),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/Help/mapContent.asp?sec=lcm-sections&title=sx-rulin
g-nyse-policymanual_303A.02&id=chp_1_4_3_2 [https://perma.cc/C3HA-WHSW]
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016). The Sarbanes Oxley Act, coupled with the listing
requirements, has helped fuel the change in composition of corporate boards; as there is
more regulation and oversight, companies must look at a larger group of candidates
(which has opened up opportunities for women). Glassman Speech, supra note 35.
37. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2013),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/Help/mapContent.asp?sec=lcm-sections&title=sx-rulin
g-nyse-policymanual_303A.02&id=chp_1_4_3_3 [https://perma.cc/N3UR-PTK5] (last
visited Aug. 20, 2016).
38. Id.; Francis & Lublin, supra note 34.
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Since the board of directors is essentially the company’s compass,
board composition is a critical part of the equation. Although
nominating processes differ across companies, the board of directors
generally creates a nominating and governance committee that reviews
and recommends nominees to the board as a whole.39 The nominating
committee is responsible for oversight during the nomination process,
and is primarily tasked with evaluating candidates for the board,
identifying the traits and talents that are required for candidates to obtain
a board nomination, and warranting nominee excellence.40
Given their role in presenting new members to the board for
appointment, nominating committees have the power to change the face
of a company. 41 Consequently, the members of the nominating
committees are also the ones held accountable by shareholders when the
committee seems to have recruited inexperienced individuals to the
board.42 It is crucial to ensure that new appointees are qualified and can
effectively run the company. Committee members, therefore, must keep
in mind the enduring life of the corporation, the corporation’s best
interests, and the applicable rules of corporate governance while
selecting new board members.43 Accordingly, the most desired traits in
new members are prior financial and industry experience, experience as
a CEO, and an understanding of information technology. 44 Surveyed
directors also mention a recent emphasis on candidates with a
background in marketing or social media.45

39. The nominating and governance committee also handles matters relating to
corporate governance principles, but the nominating role is the primary interest for
purposes of this Note. See e.g., Morgan Stanley, Nominating and Governance
Committee Charter (as amended Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.morganstanley.com/aboutus-governance/ndchart [https://perma.cc/ZLL9-P6SS] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
40. Hughes, supra note 32. See generally Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 91-96.
41. In the 2013 “What Directors Think” survey by Spencer Stuart, about two-thirds
of directors stated that endorsements from existing board members served as the most
fruitful resource for new board members, and search firms were the second most
effective. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 49.
42. Hughes, supra note 32.
43. Id.
44. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 48.
45. Id.
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B. BOARDROOMS
1. Number of Women on Boards Generally
According to the 2015 Women in S&P’s 500 Companies Survey by
Catalyst, a nonprofit organization dedicated to expanding opportunities
for women in business, women represent 44.3% of the labor force and
comprise 36.4% of mid-level managerial positions.46 However, women
hold only 19.9% of board seats, 25.1% of executive/senior level
management positions, and only 4.4% of CEO positions. 47 Women
occupied only 16.6% of Fortune 500 board seats in 2012 and that
number increased by only two percentage points in six years.48
Numerous other reports have documented the dearth of women on
boards. The United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
released a report in December 2015 on the status of women on corporate
boards, finding that in 1997, women held 8% of board seats and that
number increased to about 16% in 2014.49 Results also showed that the
number of women on boards varied across organizations.50 Generally,
women were more adequately represented on boards of large companies
than on those of small or medium companies.51 Women comprised 12%
of board positions in small companies, 15% of board positions in
medium companies, and 19% of board positions in large companies.52
Furthermore, 33% of small companies, 17% of medium companies, and
4% of large companies had boards with no women. 53 In terms of
industry-specific figures, women were most represented in boardrooms
of the household and personal products industry at about 26%, followed
by food, beverage, tobacco, and utilities industries at 21%, and in the
46. Women in S&P 500 Companies, CATALYST (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.
catalyst.org/knowledge/women-sp-500-companies [https://perma.cc/Y5VV-GAD5]; see
also Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 84.
47. Women in S&P 500 Companies, supra note 46.
48. Boris Groysberg & Deborah Bell, Dysfunction in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS.
REV. (June 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/06/dysfunction-in-the-boardroom [https://perma.
cc/XS75-9W9M].
49. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 8.
50. Id. at 10.
51. S&P 500 companies are considered large while S&P 400 are considered
medium and S&P 600 are considered small. Id. at 11.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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media industry at 20%. 54 Women were least represented in the
boardrooms of the semiconductor industry at 8.8%, energy industry at
10.5%, automobiles components industry at around 11%, and in real
estate at 12.9%.55
The GAO study also found a difference in the age and tenure
characteristics of men and women on boards. 56 On average, female
directors were younger than male directors; 45% of women were under
the age of sixty compared to 30% of men.57 Also, female board directors
had shorter tenures on boards than males; 42.1% of women served on
boards for less than five years compared to 30.2% of men, while only
10.4% of women served for more than fifteen years compared to 18.2%
of men.58
An earlier report titled, Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on
Fortune 500 Boards described the status of women in corporate
boardrooms between 2004 and 2010.59 The report found that for Fortune
100 companies, Caucasian men alone comprised 67.9% of seats in
2012.60 New Jersey Senator Bob Menendez released a survey in 2014 of
sixty-nine Fortune 100 companies and found that only 22.9% of
corporate directors were female.61
Since the 1970s, the number of women graduating from American
legal, medical, and business graduate programs has been steadily
increasing. In the 1970s, women were graduating with advanced degrees
at a rate of 30%, which increased to more than 40% in the 1990s.62 In
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Women’s average age was 60.4 years and men’s was 63.8 years. Id.
Id.
ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES: WOMEN AND MINORITIES
ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS: 2012 ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY (ABD) CENSUS
(2013), http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/2012_abd_missing_pieces_final_8_15_13.
pdf [https://perma.cc/GA42-WU2N].
60. Id.; see also Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Abysmal
Lack of Diversity in Corporate Boardrooms Is Growing Worse (May 2, 2011), http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch050211laa.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4CV-LH97].
61. BOB MENENDEZ, 2014 CORPORATE DIVERSITY SURVEY (2015), https://www.me
nendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2014%20Corporate%20Diversity%20Survey%20Re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH75-2RST].
62. Douglas M. Branson, Pathways for Women to Senior Management Positions
and Board Seats: An A to Z List, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2012).
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2013, women in the 25 to 34 age group were more likely than men in the
same age group to receive college and graduate degrees.63 Today, 9.7
million women are enrolled in undergraduate programs, representing
more than half of all undergraduates. 64 This balance between the
genders, however, is not reflected at the senior positions of corporations
where the proportion of women has remained stagnant. 65 The facts
demonstrate that women are highly represented in the lower ranks of
companies but noticeably absent from senior positions, which are
instead inundated with men.66 Accordingly, women’s opinions are not
proportionately captured in corporate decision-making. 67 Gender-blind
studies demonstrate the biases women encounter even when they are
being evaluated for hiring: “[o]ne study found that replacing a woman’s
name with a man’s name on a resume improved the odds of getting
hired by 61 percent.”68
Gender inequality remains an issue among 99% of Fortune 500
companies’ boards.69 The GAO report found that even if women were
63.

COUNCIL

OF ECON. ADVISERS, WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION AND
(2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/womens_
slides_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RT2-JJSX].
64. In contrast, male students’ enrollment was at 7.6 million, comprising 44% of
total undergraduate enrollment. Undergraduate Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cha.asp [https://perma.cc/Q4Y5YWPS]. Brande Stellings, Vice President of Corporate Board Services at Catalyst, has
aptly asked, “[I]n terms of workforce and talent pool, why would you only want to
choose from half of the available candidates?” Emily Peck, Most Men Don’t Care
About Diversity in the Boardroom, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.huffin
gtonpost.com/entry/corporate- boarddiversity_us_561510b6e4b0cf9984d7af01 [https://
perma.cc/6G5C-2R9C].
65. SANDBERG, supra note 1.
66. Id. at 15. A study spanning twenty-eight countries that evaluated data for 1.7
million employees established that “although women constitute 41% of the global
workforce only 19% of executives are female.” PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A
MARKETPLACE WITHOUT BOUNDARIES? RESPONDING TO DISRUPTION (2015),
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2015/assets/pwc-18th-annual-global-ceo-survey
-jan-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYS6-33AY] [hereinafter PwC Study] (citing MERCER,
WHEN WOMEN THRIVE, BUSINESSES THRIVE (2014)).
67. SANDBERG, supra note 1, at 5-6.
68. How to Be a Workplace MVP, LEAN IN, http://leanin.org/tips/mvp [https://perm
a.cc/6GKV-P3ZJ].
69. Claire Groden, Just 35% of Male Directors Think Having a Female Board
Member Is ‘Very Important’, FORTUNE (Oct. 6, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/06/b
THE WORKFORCE
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appointed to all imminent board openings, the number of women in the
boardroom would still not equal that of men until 2024.70 These figures
demonstrate the great disparity between the pool of qualified female
candidates and the limited number of women on corporate boards.
2. Companies that Market Products to Women
Companies in the household and personal products industry that
market products primarily to women also exhibit a striking
underrepresentation of women in senior positions and boardrooms,
although they fare better than companies in other industries.71 Recent
attention has mainly been focused on the lack of women in senior
positions within stereotypically male-dominated industries, such as in
technology. However, the dearth of women there can be more readily
explained by the lack of female candidates for higher positions in the
tech industry.72 A report from National Student Clearinghouse noted a
decline in the number of women pursuing bachelor degrees in science,
technology, engineering, and math disciplines over the past decade.73
The gender disparity was most apparent in the field of computer science:
in 2004, 23% of degrees in the field went to women, and this number

oard-member-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/4NQN-2GWH].
70. The GAO report stated that “it could take about 10 years from 2014 for women
to comprise 30% percent of board directors and more than 40 years for the
representation of women on boards to match that of men.” GAO Report, supra note 31,
at 9. NY Representative Carolyn Maloney has said, “If we do nothing, we won’t reach
gender parity on corporate boards for at least another 40 years.” Press Release, Office
of Carolyn B. Maloney, Maloney’s Newly Introduced Gender Diversity in Corporate
Leadership Act of 2016 Gains Backing of U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maloney-s-newly-introducedgender-diversity-in-corporate-leadership-act [https://perma.cc/EK8G-M2NL]
[hereinafter Maloney Press Release].
71. See, e.g., Jillian Berman, Even Companies That Sell Tampons Are Run by Men,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/21/women
-companies_n_5563256.html [https://perma.cc/YJ98-Z3ZB].
72. See Catherine Rampell, Women Falling Behind in STEM Bachelor’s Degrees,
WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/rampage/wp/2015
/01/27/women-falling-behind-in-stem-bachelors-degrees/ [https://perma.cc/K8PJ-RZ
ZU] (discussing the low percentage of women graduating in the fields of science,
technology, engineering, and math).
73. Id.
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further decreased to only 18% in 2014.74 On the other hand, there is no
lack of female candidates for higher positions within companies that
make products geared towards women because women are wellrepresented in those companies’ entry-level and mid-managerial
positions.75
Catalyst and the Huffington Post analyzed the board composition of
the largest companies that manufacture products marketed toward
women. 76 This classification spanned a wide variety of organizations:
makeup suppliers, department stores, consumer goods manufacturers,
and female-oriented clothing companies, including companies such as
Macy’s, Nordstrom, Procter & Gamble, Sears, L’Oréal, Kimberly-Clark,
and Johnson & Johnson.77 Of the nineteen companies included in the
2014 analysis, only one had a board of directors that was majority
female and only one had a C-Suite that was comprised of a majority of
women. 78 These results are particularly troubling, given the fact that
women are the primary consumers of these products. Women’s keen
understanding of customer desires in these fields gives them an
advantage over their male counterparts when it comes to making
marketing decisions.79
The deficiency of women in leadership roles at these companies
might provide insight as to the reason there are merchandises,
advertisements, and promotions that are marketed toward women but
instead appear inaccessible and outdated.80 Men comprise a majority of
senior-level management, using data and market research to make
decisions about marketing beauty and feminine products, which they
personally do not use or understand.81 Tom Falk, the CEO of Kimberly-

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Berman, supra note 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous
Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 788-89
(2011).
80. Berman, supra note 71.
81. As one director put it, “When you think about [one of the company’s products]
particularly and its relationship to women’s health and appearance, we needed . . . a
woman who, a person who looks at women’s health and who has a marketing
background.” Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 783 (alteration in original).
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Clark, realized this mismatch when creating a marketing strategy for
feminine hygiene products. 82 The company’s campaign featured an
advertisement portraying an un-relatable scenario to women. 83 Since
then, Kimberly-Clark has started programs specifically targeted at
improving female representation, and the numbers are evidence of its
success.84 Women held 19% of director positions in 2009 and by 2013,
that number had increased to 26%.85
Many may blame the lack of women on corporate boards on
“tradition” 86 and the stereotypical gender roles that view men as
dominant and women as submissive. However, it is important to
consider the full range of business implications involved. For instance,
several beauty organizations are family-run businesses where
connection with the owners may be given more credence than gender.87
C. BARRIERS TO ACHIEVING DIVERSITY
1. Low Representation of Women in Traditional Pipelines to Board
Seats
One of the contributing factors to the dearth of women on corporate
boards is that new directors are overwhelmingly chosen based on prior
CEO, CFO, director or senior management experience, which most
women lack.88 There is a dominant perception that prior management or
directorship experience is a necessary qualification for a director
position.89 Data demonstrates that “[o]ver one-half of male Fortune 500
board members in 2001 were CEOs or former CEOs.”90 A study done by
Russell Reynolds Associates Inc. demonstrates that companies are
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Berman, supra note 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Estee Lauder and L’Oréal are two such examples.
See supra Section I.A (discussing board member qualifications).
Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 106; see also Bonnie Gwin, Trends in Board
Composition over the Past Five Years, HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES BOARD MONITOR
(2014), http://www.heidrick.com/~/media/Publications%20and%20Reports/Trends-in-b
oard-composition-over-the-past-five-years.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7VN-XYCK].
90. Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Corporate Boardroom: Still a Male Club, 33 J.
CORP. L. 665, 670 (2008).
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hesitant to break this pattern and pick fresh talent, and instead choose to
focus on the “usual suspects.”91
Since there is a premium placed on experience, boards are blinding
themselves to a whole pool of candidates and instead narrowing the
scope of selection to senior level candidates, which are
disproportionately men. 92 A study published in the Harvard Business
Review found that 19% of male directors preferred to focus “solely on
qualifications and experience” while disregarding gender in the selection
process.93 This is evidenced by the fact that in 2014, women made up
only 4% of CEOs of S&P 1500 companies, and Fortune 500 companies’
boards prioritized former or current CEO experience in the selection of
new members. 94 Around 45% of female directors and 67% of male
directors have been CFOs or CEOs of a company previously.95 Since
women are often excluded from these roles in the first place, they are
less likely to be considered for board positions.
2. Women Fail to Live up to the Stereotypical Male Leader
There is a mismatch between the dominant and authoritative
behaviors associated with leadership and traditionally female qualities.96
Stereotypical male leadership qualities are considered unattractive when

91. Joann S. Lublin, This Is Why Corporate Boards Aren’t More Diverse, WALL
ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2014/04/15/this-is-why-corpo
rate-boards-arent-more-diverse/ [http://perma.cc/X9NZ-E7LJ].
92. Tamara S. Smallman, Note, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’s Role in
Cracking the Door Open so Women May Enter, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 808
(2013) (noting that “women hold only about a quarter of . . . senior level positions”).
93. Groysberg & Bell, supra note 48; see also Groden, supra note 69 (noting that
female directors were more likely than male directors to acknowledge the importance of
diversity on boards).
94. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 14 (noting that “current and former CEOs
composed nearly half of new appointments to boards of Fortune 500 companies in
2014”); see also Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 49 (stating that the 2013 Spencer Stuart
Board Index found that those who had previous leadership experience and had held
senior positions in companies made up 23% of new appointees to boards in 2013, an
increase from 16% in 2012.).
95. Lublin, supra note 91.
96. In interviews, many directors specifically mentioned the cliché that men are
from Mars and women are from Venus. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at
780.
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exhibited by women. Typically, “[t]he ideal leader, like the ideal man, is
decisive, assertive, and independent. In contrast, women are expected to
be nice, caretaking, and unselfish.”97 The same behaviors that make men
seem confident and self-assured make women seem vain or impolite.98
Compared to their male counterparts, “women who excel in traditionally
male domains are viewed as competent but less likable.”99 On the other
hand, when women are “conventionally feminine,” they gain in
likability but lose out on respect, as they appear “too emotional to make
tough decisions and too soft to be strong leaders.”100 This has come to be
known as a “double bind,” in which women must choose between being
viewed as likable but ineffective, or capable and unlikable.101 To ascend
to executive positions, women are expected to behave like men:
Young women today are urged to finish school, find a job, acquire
skills, develop seniority, get tenure, make partner, work endless
hours, and put children off until the very last minute. When and if
they do give birth, they are expected to treat the event like an
appendectomy, take a brief time out for recuperation and then
resume the truly important business of business.102

Because most directors are male, the director voting process is skewed
towards choosing new members who adhere to a similar leadership

97. Herminia Ibarra et al., Women Rising: The Unseen Barriers, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept. 2013, at 65. A Columbia Business School study showed the impact of gender on
likability by capturing students’ opinions through a case study involving a venture
capitalist. Students’ reactions differed based only on whether the venture capitalist was
named “Howard” or “Heidi”: “Howard was described as likeable and Heidi was seen as
selfish and ‘not the type of person you would want to hire or work for.’” How to Be a
Workplace MVP, supra note 68.
98. See How to Be a Workplace MVP, supra note 68.
99. Id. One male director made this observation about a female director who was
no longer at the company: “[s]he was exceedingly competent and assertive and asked a
lot of questions and pressed a lot of issues and I think some people got uncomfortable. I
don’t know whether they got uncomfortable with her because of the issues she was
raising or because she was raising issues and was a woman . . . but she wasn’t around
very long.” Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 785.
100. Ibarra et al., supra note 97.
101. CATALYST, THE DOUBLE BIND DILEMMA FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP:
DAMNED IF YOU DO, DOOMED IF YOU DON’T (2007), http://www.catalyst.org/knowled
ge/double-bind [https://perma.cc/RET5-9A8Z].
102. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 29 (10th ed. 2002).
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archetype. 103 In the GAO study, many stakeholders disclosed how
boards of directors want to “maintain a certain level of comfort in the
boardroom” by picking new directors who “fit in.”104 While half of the
appointments are made based on executive recruiters’ efforts, there is a
strong reliance on personal connections for the remainder of
appointments.105 The director nomination process has traditionally been
“insular,” and consequentially, a networking game.106
Sheryl Sandberg, the COO of Facebook, has said, “The gender
stereotypes introduced in childhood are reinforced throughout our lives
and become self-fulfilling prophecies. Most leadership positions are
held by men, so women don’t expect to achieve them, and that becomes
one of the reasons they don’t.”107 Social scientists call this phenomenon
the “stereotype threat”: being aware of a negative stereotype makes it
more likely for an individual in that group to be negatively affected by
it. 108 The stereotype threat is a contributing factor in discouraging
women from rising to executive ranks and from entering technical
fields, such as computer science. 109 Many, including Sandberg, have
103. Id. at 31; Berman, supra note 71 (“Some will say that women often don’t fit the
typical image of a leader, putting them at a disadvantage when it comes to decisions
about promotions and pay. ‘Typically the prototype of the leader is a white male,’ said
Ragins, the University of Wisconsin professor. ‘So when we think about who is going
to be the next CEO of the company, the image that comes to mind is often that of a
white heterosexual male.’”).
104. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 13; see also Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra
note 79, at 785 (“[An African-American male director of a national company] described
his board colleagues—bluntly—as ‘all in these gated communities . . . comfortable
talking with people who are just like they are.’ The night before the meeting ‘they go
out to dinner with each other’ and do not invite him.”).
105. See GAO Report, supra note 31, at 13.
106. See RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES, DIFFERENT IS BETTER—WHY DIVERSITY
MATTERS IN THE BOARDROOM 1 (2009), http://www.russellreynolds.com/insights/thoug
ht-leadership/Documents/different-is-better_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9VL-UY7H].
107. SANDBERG, supra note 1, at 22.
108. Stereotype Threat Widens Achievement Gap, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION (July 15, 2006), http://www.apa.org/research/action/stereotype.aspx [https
://perma.cc/9MPD-V9WY].
109. CATHERINE HILL ET AL., WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
ENGINEERING AND MATHEMATICS (2010), http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Why-SoFew-Women-in-Science-Technology-Engineering-and-Mathematics.pdf [http://perma.
cc/3446-E7B8]; see also supra Section I.B (discussing figures of women graduating
with STEM degrees).
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pointed to the fact that women are troubled with self-doubt more often
than men, which hinders their success.110
3. Inflexibility of the Workplace to Meet the Demands of Motherhood
The workplace is simply out of sync with family life.111 Family and
work priorities clash fiercely, and the United States lags behind other
nations when it comes to arranging flexible work opportunities for
women. 112 During the same years that women’s careers demand the
greatest time investment, their biological clocks tick with the pressure to
have children. 113 Although women are getting married and having
children at a later age, they still have an internal biological clock
dictating the ideal time to have children, should they choose to do so.114

110. See generally SANDBERG, supra note 1. Warren Buffett, in an interview with
The Levo, has stated,

I’ve seen very, very bright women. I use the example of Katherine
Graham, who was outstanding. While she was CEO of the
Washington Post the stock went up 40 for 1, she won a Pulitzer
Prize, but she had been told by her mother, she’d been told by her
husband, she’d been told by lots of people that women weren’t as
good as men in business. It was nonsense. I kept telling her, “Quit
looking in that fun house mirror. You know, here’s a real mirror.
You’re something.” And as smart as she was, as high grade as she
was, you know, as famous as she became, right to her dying day she
had that little voice inside her that kept repeating what her mother
told her a long time ago.
Caroline Wright, Warren Buffett’s Advice to YoPro Millennial Women, YAHOO! FIN.
(May 9, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/warren-buffett-advice-yopro-millennial124938241.html [http://perma.cc/6Z37-BDRT].
111. See, e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 30-32. See generally JULIA
WARTENBERG, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WORK-LIFE CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES
(2011), https://www.coc.org/files/Briefing%20Paper%207%20Work%20Life%20Confl
ict.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8P2-D95Q]; JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSHEY, THE
THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT (2010), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/w
p-content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK42-UUFY].
112. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 36.
113. See id. at 30-31.
114. Technically, the “optimal” age to have children according to John Mirowsky,
sociologist at University of Texas, is between 21.8 and 39.5 years. See generally John

224

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

Women who choose to have children face the challenge of balancing
their home and work lives. Since partners do not typically share equally
in the housework and child rearing, women are essentially left with two
full-time jobs, and the workplace has not evolved to give women with
children the flexibility they need to fulfill their responsibilities. The
government is an apt illustration of an establishment that strengthens the
traditional gendered division of labor, as evidenced by its imbalanced
offering of civil and fiscal protections to the sexes.115 This traditional
concept is also evident in the educational realm; the fact that school days
end in the middle of the afternoon and have summer breaks is based on
the presumption that the caretaker does not have a full-time job and can
take care of the children.116
The impediments women face in their climb to higher ranks
concerns Felice N. Schwartz, the founder and president of Catalyst.117
She argues that “women are different from men—they have babies—
and because of biology, tradition, and socialization, many might want to
reduce their work pace for a time to raise their children. This made
women more expensive to hire than men . . . because some will need
flexibility and a temporarily slower career path.” 118 Offering this
flexibility, however, works to the employer’s advantage because there is
a greater sacrifice in losing capable women than there is in
accommodating them.119
Despite setbacks in the workplace today, women have come a long
way from where they started. The first group of women to receive
higher education graduated in the early 1900s.120 At first, these women
had to choose between their career and their families and if they wanted

Mirowsky, Parenthood and Health: The Pivotal and Optimal Age at First Birth, 81
SOC. FORCES 315, 341 (2002).
115. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 6.
116. Rebecca Traister, The Single American Woman, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/02/political-power-single-women-c-v-r.html [https://per
ma.cc/8JAU-ZT9W].
117. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 30-33.
118. Id. at 30-31.
119. Id. at 31 (“She assumed that only women might want a non-career dominant
period in their lives and that only mothers are more costlier to hire, overlooking the
factors, including excessive competitiveness, that make some men expensive
propositions as well.”).
120. Id. at 33.
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a career, they had to completely abandon their home lives.121 Later, even
if women went to work, it was either before or after they had children,
and their options were limited to teaching, nursing or secretarial work—
the few fields open to women.122 The college-educated baby boomers
were the next group of female graduates and the first women to try to
have both a family and a career.123 These women chased their career
aspirations and deferred having children for as long as they could.124
Female graduates today are the first to start their careers “at near
parity with men,”125 yet they recognize that receiving similar prospects
121.
122.

Id.
Id. Warren Buffett, in an interview with the Levo League, stated,
I was born in 1930, I had an older sister Doris, a few years older; a
younger sister Bertie, a few years younger. Absolutely as smart as I
am—probably a little smarter—and much more personable. They got
along better in the world and all of that.
My parents—our parents—loved us all equally, they never told my
sisters “you can’t do this” or “you can’t do that”—verbally—but
every message they got from society, from their teachers in every
way was that their job was to marry well and that if they insisted on
working that they could be a secretary, or a nurse or a teacher.
And essentially they were telling me, again silently in many ways,
that the sky was the limit. So we would go to school, we would get
similar grades, they had everything going for them—except that they
were women.
Society just said if you want to be a teacher, fine. If you want to be a
nurse, fine. If you want to be a secretary, fine. But forget everything
else. So, I have seen that change in my lifetime, although change
was slow…It has changed a lot for the better. There’s still important
ways to go.

Wright, supra note 110.
123. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 33.
124. Id.
125. See On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity–For Now, PEW RES. CTR.
(Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/on-pay-gap-millennial-wo
men-near-parity-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/R66R-PSET] [hereinafter Pew Study]
(stating that the millennial generation of young women are “better educated than their
mothers and grandmothers had been . . . [b]ut when they look ahead they see
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as men does not level the playing field in terms of their professional
success.126 Women spend a great deal of time and money preparing for
careers despite the uncertainty surrounding their professional aspirations
once they have children.127 They are aware of the reality that mothers are
often at a disadvantage,128 and are more inclined to find that men are
favored in society, 129 and that not enough has been done to advance
workplace equality.130 Women’s sidelining in their professions is often
excused as “something women ‘choose’ or as part of life’s inevitable
compromises.”131
Part of the problem in the workplace is the fact that raising children
in America is hardly measured as work.132 In the modern economy, twothirds of all wealth is created by human skills and creativity, which
means that parents who are rearing children are major wealth producers
in our economy.133 Ann Crittenden, author of The Price of Motherhood,
has stated that since individual skills are the necessary source of
financial growth, caregivers have “the most important job in the world”
as it is their job to nurture those skills from a young age.134 However,
economists consider the time required to raise children135 as “periods of
non-participation in the workforce,” during which an individual’s
professional skills and economic usefulness decrease in value.136
roadblocks to their success . . . [and] think it’s easier for men to get top executive jobs
than it is for women”).
126. SANDBERG, supra note 1, at 15.
127. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 35.
128. 71% of working women without children and 56% of working women with
children have the perception that becoming a mother prejudices their professional goals.
Interestingly, only 30% of working mothers said motherhood has actually negatively
affected their careers, although after having their first child, some mothers did reduce
their work hours. Jenna Goudreau, ForbesWoman and TheBump.com Survey Results,
FORBES (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/01/family-career-workingmother-forbes-woman-time-survey.html [https://perma.cc/JSW3-SYRM].
129. 53% of women vs 36% of men. Pew Study, supra note 125.
130. 72% of women vs 61% of men. Id.
131. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 44.
132. Id. at. 11.
133. Id. at 8 (“Unpaid female caregiving is not only the life blood of families, it is
the very heart of the economy.”).
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Crittenden notes that “the only things that atrophy when a woman has children
are her income and her leisure.” Id.
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Individuals who undertake the role of nurturer are discouraged and
even punished for performing the job that is critical to human
advancement. This creates a contradiction wherein the importance of
family and raising children is emphasized, but the work it takes to make
a family is overlooked.137 Parents who choose to spend any meaningful
amount of time with their children suffer a substantial economic cost.138
In reality, one parent has to sacrifice advancing his or her career to take
care of the children, and it is typically the mother.139 Women fall behind
men in their career paths as they are often forced to scale back and drop
out of the workforce or lose networking prospects and other
opportunities 140 : “[u]nfortunately, women’s efforts to manage the
incongruity between organizational practice and their multiple roles is
seen as evidence that they are not serious about their careers and not that
organizations have failed to adapt to their needs.” 141 As a result,
organizations and mentors focus their efforts on men, who are perceived
as more secure investments.142
Stay-at-home mothers make it possible for their male spouses to
advance in their careers and attain senior positions in the workplace.
According to a Harvard Business School study, only 10% of women
have a partner who does not work full-time compared to 60% of men.143
137. “[G]overnment social policies don’t even define unpaid care of family
dependents as work. A family’s primary caregiver is not considered a full productive
citizen, eligible in her own right for the major social insurance programs. Nannies earn
social security credits; mothers at home do not.” Id. at 6.
138. Id.
139. Mothers also are more likely to experience family-related career disruptions:
39% of mothers report having to take a significant amount of time off from work to
care for a child or family member compared to 24% of working fathers; 59% of
millennial women (18 to 32 year olds) think that it is more difficult to progress in one’s
career when one is a working parent, compared to 19% of millennial men. Pew Study,
supra note 125.
140. Not all those in the Pew Study in 2012 who reduced working hours to take care
of family saw an impact on their career, but among those who did, 35% of women said
it hurt their careers compared to 17% of men. Id.
141. Gelaye Debebe, Creating a Safe Environment for Women’s Leadership
Transformation, 35 J. MGMT. EDUC. 679, 682 (2011) (citing Vinnicombe & Singh,
Women-only Management Training: An Essential Part of Women’s Leadership
Development, 3 J. CHANGE MGMT 294 (2003)).
142. SANDBERG, supra note 1, at 14.
143. Boris Groysberg & Robin Abrahams, Manage Your Work, Manage Your Life,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2014, at 65. Another study found that over half (55%) of male

228

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

A Pew Research survey found that 51% of mothers with young children
(under the age of eighteen) compared to only 16% of fathers opined that
working and parenting has made career advancement more difficult for
them.144
Women in the workforce are not necessarily employed in the
professions or at the salaries commensurate with their education and
training.145 A Harvard Business School study in 2014 found that even
the most highly educated married women were not meeting their
economic or professional goals. 146 Even though they had comparable
ambition and education as their male spouses, they prioritized their
husbands’ careers.147 The overwhelming consensus among Generation X
Harvard Business School graduates is that men expect their own careers
to take the utmost priority while women find that their spouses’ careers
often take precedence over their own.148
Recently, stay-at-home fathers have helped their female spouses
advance in their careers. In many instances where women have achieved
high ranks in a corporation, their husbands have sacrificed their own
careers to care for the children. Leslie Blodgett, founder of the global
cosmetic empire Bare Essentials, stated that “[t]o make it to the top, you
need a wife.”149 Carly Fiorina’s husband retired early from AT&T when

executives who are married have partners who stay at home, while only 12% of married
female business leaders have comparable support from their partners. Caroline
Fairchild, The Rise of Stay at Home Dads? For Female Execs, Not So Much, FORTUNE:
MOST POWERFUL WOMEN (Nov. 20, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/20/stay-athome-dads-female-execs/ [https://perma.cc/VWX8-JQX9].
144. Pew Study, supra note 125.
145. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 28.
146. Robin J. Ely, Pamela Stone & Colleen Ammerman, Rethink What You Know
About High Achieving Women, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2014, at 101, https://hbr.org/201
4/12/rethink-what-you-know-about-high-achieving-women [http://perma.cc/MLB3-ZA
JM].
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. When an executive told Dawn Lepore, the CEO of Drugstore.com from 2004
until its sale to Walgreens, that her job was made easy due to her husband’s willingness
to stay at home, she remarked, “[N]o, not easy. He makes it possible.” Carol Hymowitz,
Behind Every Great Woman, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Jan. 5, 2012, 3:53 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-04/behind-every-great-woman [http:
//perma.cc/KX3K-8PFJ].
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she was appointed Hewlett-Packard’s CEO. 150 Similarly, numerous
female executives of other Fortune 500 companies, including Xerox’s
Ursula Burns, PepsiCo’s Indra Nooyi, WellPoint’s Angela Braly, and
IBM’s Ginni Rometty, had husbands who scaled back their careers.151
At Fortune’s Most Powerful Women Summit in 2002, 30% of the 187
participants had stay-at-home spouses.152 While stay-at-home fathers are
no longer unusual, they are not the norm either.153 The facts indicate that
it is difficult for a parent to rise through the ranks to chief executive
without having a stay-at-home spouse or outsourcing childcare.154
4. Not All Mentoring Is Created Equal
While men advance through mentoring and sponsorship, women do
not receive such opportunities in the same capacity.155 Mentorship is the
process by which individuals receive feedback and advice from more
knowledgeable colleagues, and sponsorship is when the mentor draws
on his or her connections with senior managers to promote the
mentee.156 Though similar, sponsorship is indispensable to rising in the
ranks of one’s career. 157 Without sponsorship, it is less probable that

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Fairchild, supra note 143.
This gendered division of labor still resonates with younger generations. A
Harvard Business Review study found that over half (66%) of millennial men expect
their partners to assume the role as primary caretaker, while 42% of millennial women
expect to fill that role. See Ben Geier, Will Millennial Men Keep Their Wives From
Career Success?, FORTUNE: MOST POWERFUL WOMEN (Nov. 18, 2014, 3:36 PM),
http://fortune.com/2014/11/18/will-millennial-men-keep-their-wives-from-career-succe
ss/ [http://perma.cc/39GQ-7UFY]. In 1988, 19% of men in the U.S. regularly cared for
children under age five and that number increased to 32% in 2010. Still, the stereotype
against stay-at-home dads is that they are slackers and like to play golf. See Hymowitz,
supra note 149.
154. While it is less common, there are executives with equally driven spouses. See,
e.g., Fairchild, supra note 143.
155. Susan Colantuono, The Career Advice You Probably Didn’t Get, TED (Sept.
2014), https://www.ted.com/talks/susan_colantuono_the_career_advice_you_probably_
didn_t_get/transcript?language=en [http://perma.cc/228N-ELYX].
156. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97.
157. See Kathy Caprino, The Top 6 Communication Challenges Professional
Women Face, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kathycaprino/2012/
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women will seek out or be selected for leading roles. 158 Surveys and
interviews conducted by the Harvard Business Review have suggested
that women who are skilled and ambitious are “overmentored and
undersponsored.” 159 Men have an easier time obtaining sponsors who
will encourage their advancement. 160 Even when women do find
mentors, the advancement opportunities that these relationships lead to
are fewer than those acquired by men through their mentors.161 Women
are also typically mentored by junior staff, which slows their rate of
advancement.162
Unexamined mindsets about how men and women interact in the
workforce impacts the advice women are given from mentors and
sponsors on their way to the top. Mentors struggle to determine what
type of advice is useful for women in a landscape that favors masculine
characteristics. As one participant from a Harvard study explains,
“[E]ven well-intended mentors have trouble helping women navigate the
fine line between being ‘not aggressive enough’ or ‘lacking in presence’
and being ‘too aggressive’ or ‘too controlling.’”163 On the one hand, men
have mentors who have helped them come to power in new positions,
strategize prospective moves, and have publicly supported their
authority.164 Contrastingly, women’s narratives reveal “how mentoring
relationships have helped them understand themselves, their preferred
styles of operating, and ways they might need to change as they move
up the leadership pipeline.”165

12/06/the-top-6-communication-challenges-professional-women-face/2/#27f6ca373c35
[http://perma.cc/98CQ-YYUV].
158. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97; see also Shane Ferro, It Takes Just 2 Years
Before Corporate America Drains Women of Their Ambition, BUSINESS INSIDER (May
18, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/women-and-ambition-a-corporate-story-20
15-5 [http://perma.cc/PT7H-V4BN].
159. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97.
160. See Caprino, supra note 157.
161. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97.
162. See id.
163. See id. To illustrate this point, consider a male executive who proudly
mentored both a man and a woman. Commenting on his role, he said, “I helped the
woman build confidence, I helped the man learn the business and I didn’t realize that I
was treating them any differently.” See Colantuono, supra note 155.
164. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97.
165. See id.
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After a couple of years in the workforce, men’s assurances and
desires remain unchanged, while women’s sink radically.166 By the midpoint of their careers, women do not feel that their superiors support
their ambitions, while men feel otherwise. 167 Once women receive
feedback indicating that they do not seem to possess the desired
characteristics for promotion, they tone down their aspirations. 168 A
survey published in the Harvard Business Review also discovered a lack
of recognition on the part of male directors regarding the biases faced by
female directors.169 While the women felt like outsiders, the men were
unaware that women felt this way. 170 The fact that men and women
generally have different interests may contribute to women’s symptoms
of alienation.171
The ability to understand a business in its entirety is crucial to
corporate governance, but there is a disconnect between the advice
women get from their mentors and the skills that are truly necessary to
become a corporate leader.172 Susan Colantuono, the CEO of Leading
Women, explained in her TED talk that leadership could be divided into
three categories: “personal greatness,” “engaging the greatness in
others,” and “business, strategic, and financial acumen.”173 These three
components are not weighted evenly when it comes to rising in a
company. 174 Business, strategic, and financial acumen is twice as
important when identifying employees with potential.175
To advance from entry-level positions to middle management,
women are told to exemplify qualities of personal greatness (by proving
themselves to be sharp, diligent, honest, and loyal individuals), and also
engage the greatness of others (interact with customers, embolden their
166.
167.

See Ferro, supra note 158.
See Julie Coffman & Bill Neuenfeldt, Everyday Moments of Truth: Frontline
Managers Are Key to Women’s Career Aspirations, BAIN & CO. (June 17, 2014),
http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/everyday-moments-of-truth.aspx [http://perm
a.cc/KE6C-ANHT].
168. See Ferro, supra note 158.
169. See Groysberg & Bell, supra note 48.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. In order to rise to higher levels of management, individuals need a wide range
of skills. PwC Study, supra note 66.
173. See Colantuono, supra note 155.
174. See id.
175. See id.
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co-workers, negotiate successfully, handle conflicts, and communicate
effectively). 176 However, the above guidance lacks any mention of
business, strategic, and financial acumen, which is necessary to advance
from middle management positions to higher levels of governance.
5. Identified Patterns
Even when women serve on boards, their power is often minimal
and certain patterns have been identified, including a lack of critical
mass, the groupthink phenomenon, and the trophy woman phenomenon.
The theory of critical mass was applied to gender diversity in
boardrooms for the first time in 2006 when researchers demonstrated
that having three or more women in the boardroom could lead to crucial
changes in the workplace. 177 As the percentage of women in a group
increases, women can form alliances, increase their visibility, and have a
greater impact on board discussions. 178 Debra Walton, chief content
officer of Thomson Reuters has acknowledged this as the “‘Power of
Three’: One woman is a token, two are a presence and three are a
voice.”179 When there is less than a critical mass of women, it reduces
women’s effectiveness as leaders because their power is often reduced
by the “solo woman phenomenon” or “tokenism,” whereby a single
member of a minority group is treated as a token and is on the receiving
end of excessive criticism and scrutiny.180 Women in fewer numbers on

176.
177.

See id.
VICKI W. KRAMER, ALISON M. KONRAD & SUMRU ERKUT, CRITICAL MASS ON
CORPORATE BOARDS: WHY THREE OR MORE WOMEN ENHANCE GOVERNANCE (2006),
https://www.wcwonline.org/pdf/CriticalMassExecSummary.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y9W
R-3RZ3].
178. See id. While boards with at least one woman function better than those
composed solely of men, boards with three or more women enjoy particular success.
Groden, supra note 69.
179. Debra Walton, Executive Perspective: Investing in Equality, the Potential of
Boardroom Diversity, THOMSON REUTERS: SUSTAINABILITY (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://sustainability.thomsonreuters.com/2014/11/04/executive-perspective-investingequality-potential-boardroom-diversity/ [http://perma.cc/34RH-63DT].
180. See Section I.C.5 for discussion of the trophy woman phenomenon. Women
achieve more influence in boardrooms when they reach “critical mass” of three or more
of them on a given board. See KRAMER, KONRAD & ERKUT, supra note 177; see also
Sonja S. Carlson, “Women Directors”: A Term of Art Showcasing the Need for
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boards must deal with visibility, polarization, and assimilation issues,
and are scrutinized more closely while frequently feeling isolated.181
Groupthink is the “psychological behavior of minimising conflicts
and reaching a consensus decision without critically evaluating
alternative ideas in a cohesive in-group environment.”182 It involves selfdeception and is motivated by the pressure to conform to group attitudes
and mores. 183 Groupthink is particularly harmful in boards because it
compromises the individual members’ ability to voice differing
opinions, instead creating a pressurized environment wherein directors
are reluctant to defy the norm.184
Even when women are appointed to boards, statistics show that
their numbers may be inflated due to the trophy phenomenon, under
which the same “token” or “trophy” woman is appointed to multiple
boards. In the U.S., it is not uncommon to find one woman serving on
multiple boards, even up to seven boards at a time.185 This distorts the
statistics, and thus, the true number of distinct women directors must be
smaller than that indicated by Catalyst’s 19.9% figure.186 These “token”
appointments give the appearance that companies care about gender
diversity when in reality they have not made it a priority.187
Critics worry that boards with these trophy directors are
overextended and therefore unable to deliver appropriate company
supervision. 188 It is important to note that women are predominantly
associated with trophy director status, while many men are involved

Meaningful Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 337,
351 (2012).
181. Carlson, supra note 180, at 351.
182. Eric YW Leung, Diversifying the Board–A Step Towards Better Governance,
ACAA GLOBAL (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.accaglobal.com/in/en/student/examsupport-resources/professional-exams-study-resources/p1/technical-articles/diversifying
-the-board—a-step-towards-better-governance.html [https://perma.cc/KA2L-CUHW].
183. See James McRitchie, Groupthink in the Boardroom Context, CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.corpgov.net/2015/02/groupthink-boardroomcontext/ [http://perma.cc/YS3E-3S77].
184. Id.
185. See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards:
How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 379 (2014).
186. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
187. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 14.
188. Rhode & Packel, supra note 185, at 382.
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with only one or two boards.189 The number of female trophy directors
has grown exponentially, increasing from nineteen in 2001 to eighty in
2006.190 Governance consultant Bonnie Hill is one such example.191 She
commented on how companies “‘like to bring on people who have a
track record’ [of serving] on other boards.” 192 She herself has eleven
years of experience holding directorships at Home Depot Inc. and Yum
Brand Inc. and has been frequently requested to join an additional
Fortune 250 company’s board.193
Moreover, when boards already have one or two women on board,
their appointment of another woman is less likely.194 The phenomenon
was noticeable across small, medium, and large corporations in 2014
with respect to women’s board appointments.195 Of companies that had
no women on their boards, 29% added one woman; of companies that
had one female, 15% added an additional; and of companies that had
two females on their boards, only 6% added another female.196 This has
prevented women from achieving the “critical mass” necessary to
influence corporate decisions.
6. Some Boards Do Not Find a Lack of Diversity Problematic
Recent studies show that America’s business elite deem the current
board makeup acceptable and do not view the lack of gender diversity as
a particularly urgent issue. 197 A 2015 study by LeanIn.org and
McKinsey & Company noted corporations’ somewhat hypocritical
189. Id.; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are
We Still Talking About This?, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 219, 239240 (2015). According to the GAO study, it is more probable for female board directors
to sit on multiple boards compared to male directors. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 12.
18.9% of women sit on three boards compared to 14.7% of men and 8.9% of women sit
on four boards compared to 6.6% of men. Id.
190. Trautman, supra note 189, at 240.
191. Joann S. Lublin, This Is Why Corporate Boards Aren’t More Diverse, WALL
ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2014/04/15/this-is-why-corpo
rate-boards-arent-more-diverse/ [http://perma.cc/X9NZ-E7LJ].
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 13-14.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Carlson, supra note 180, at 357-58.
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treatment of the issue of gender diversity in the boardroom, which is an
unfortunate situation, given that “the road to equal representation in
corporate America lacks backing from those in the best position to build
it.” 198 According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (“PwC”) 2016 Annual
Corporate Directors Survey of 884 public company directors, 41% of
male directors labeled gender diversity as a “very important” attribute
for their companies’ boards, compared to 37% two years ago.199 Most
women said diversity in the boardroom benefits the corporation, while
most men did not agree.200
The fact that existing boards fail to find diversity important is tied
to the lack of women in these positions. Boards made up mostly of men
may also be less welcoming to new members, while those with female
members are more likely to add new members. 201 This is significant
because newer members of boards are more likely to view diversity as a
positive attribute.202 While some organizations have instituted a policy
to promote diversity, nearly a third of the 1322 CEOs in a 2014 PwC
survey had not.203 Roughly 64% of CEOs declared that their companies
maintain a diversity and inclusiveness strategy, 13% stated that their
companies did not have such a policy but did plan to implement one,
while 17% of CEOs’ companies did not have such a strategy in place
nor did they plan on enacting one.204

198. Katy Osborn, What Corporate Boards Really Think About Diversity, MONEY
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://time.com/money/4061669/corporate-boards-diversity/ [http://perm
a.cc/34PE-FFKL].
199. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SWINGING PENDULUM: BOARD GOVERNANCE
IN THE AGE OF SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT (2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corpo
rate-governance/annual-corporate-directors-survey/assets/pwc-2016-annual-corporate
—directors—survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4VP-W796].
200. Just 31% of men thought diversity would enhance corporate operations. Peck,
supra note 64. See also Groden, supra note 69 (noting that “[a]ccording to Bloomberg,
63% of female respondents—compared with 35% of men—said that having women on
corporate boards was very important”).
201. Gupta, supra note 2.
202. Groden, supra note 69.
203. PwC Study, supra note 66, at 32.
204. Id. In this instance, diversity strategy considers diversity generally, not solely
with respect to gender.
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D. THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY
The case for diversity can be categorized as either an economic or
ethical argument. The economic argument, known as the business case
for diversity, holds that boardroom diversity enhances a company’s
bottom line financial performance. 205 On the other hand, the ethical
argument calls for equal opportunity and inclusiveness.206
1. Business Case
The business case for diversity argues that diversity leads to better
economic outcomes. 207 Studies have shown that corporations with
diverse boards enjoy greater profits, as diversity “leads to better
decision-making, improved performance of monitoring functions, and
stronger market penetration.” 208 Studies have also shown that
corporations with female board members realize greater benefits in
terms of stock value, equity yield, and growth compared to companies
where women were nonexistent on boards. 209 Dr. Aaron Dhir, author
of Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance,
and Diversity, has identified several positive outcomes when three or
more women are present on boards:
(1) Enhanced dialogue
(2) Better decision-making, including the value of dissent

205.
206.
207.
208.

Carlson, supra note 180, at 339.
Id.
Id at 341.
Id at 343. See also No News Is Bad News: Women’s Leadership Still Stalled in
Corporate America, CATALYST (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.catalyst.org/media/nonews-bad-news-womens-leadership-still-stalled-corporate-america [https://perma.cc/45
D9-AVLL].
209. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 84. See also MARCUS NOLAND, TYLER MORAN
& BARBARA KOTSCHWAR, IS GENDER DIVERSITY PROFITABLE? ANALYSIS FROM A
GLOBAL SURVEY (2016), https://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16-3.pdf [http://perma.cc/
ZN6X-H9G8]; PwC Study, supra note 66, at 28; Daniel Victor, Women in Company
Leadership Tied to Stronger Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/02/10/business/women-in-company-leadership-tied-to-stronger-profits.html
[https://perma.cc/SL5T-RHH5].
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(3) More effective risk mitigation and crisis management, and a
better balance between risk-welcoming and risk-aversion behavior
(4) Higher quality monitoring of and guidance to management
(5) Positive changes to the boardroom environment and culture
(6) More orderly and systematic board work
(7) Positive changes in the behavior of men.210

Thus, the benefits of board diversity translate directly to improved
corporate performance.
For companies to succeed, their boards should have market
reciprocity, i.e., they should be a reflection of their customer base.211
Women account for well over 70% of the purchasing power in the
household and $20 trillion of global purchases.212 Currently, only 16%
of directors have the impression that their boards grasp the
undercurrents of the industries in which their corporations operate.213 If
the percentage of female directors were more proportionate to the
percentage of female employees and the female customer base,
companies would develop a better understanding of the marketplace,
which could increase corporate profits. 214 Therefore, obtaining the
female perspective is consistent with directors’ fiduciary duties to
enhance the companies’ value for their shareholders.
Investors have also expressed concern over boardrooms satiated
with directors who have been around for a long time, as their ties to the
company may make them less disposed to defy senior directors. 215

210. Aimee Hansen, Overdue Change? How Women Impact on Boardroom
Dynamics and Why Boards Need It, THE GLASSHAMMER (Apr. 16, 2015), http://theglass
hammer.com/2015/04/16/overdue-change-how-women-impact-on-boardroom-dynamic
s-and-why-boards-need-it/ [http://perma.cc/72PE-9JZJ].
211. Deborah Gills, the President of Catalyst, stated that “[t]o serve the market, you
need to look like the market and secondly . . . advancing any business in any industry
requires the full talent that’s available in the marketplace.” Berman, supra note 71.
212. Id.
213. Barton & Wiseman, supra note 15.
214. Leung, supra note 182.
215. Corporations frequently contend that these longstanding board members add
value to the corporation as they are familiar with the company, and that independence
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Having a diverse board could improve a firm’s investor relations, as
directors can strengthen ties with investors by making decisions that
keep them satisfied with how the company is being run.216 Boards are
now paying more attention to investor recommendations.217 As PwC’s
Annual Corporate Directors Survey found, “[i]n some ways, the
pendulum has swung from a ‘board-centric’ model that took root after
the governance and accounting scandals of the 1990s to an ‘investorcentric’ model today.”218
The business case for having more women on boards has its
limitations, as the research does not explain exactly how board
heterogeneity may change the corporate setting. 219 Specifically, it is
difficult to decipher whether companies with better financial
performance have the capacity to add women to their boards, or if
women choose to work for more successful companies, or if women
positively influence a company’s performance.220 Furthermore, it can be
challenging to distinctively identify an individual director’s impact on
company performance.221
2. Moral Argument
Morally, diversity on corporate boards is important since it
demonstrates an equal opportunity for both men and women. 222 This
by itself does not ensure that directors will act in the stakeholders’ interests. Francis &
Lublin, supra note 34.
216. See Leung, supra note 182.
217. 18% of directors say that they use recommendations from investors, compared
to 11% 5 year ago. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 199, at 1.
218. Id.
219. Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board
Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 434 (2008) (noting that there
needs to be more empirical work to completely understand the precise manner in which
diversity on boards influences a corporation’s performance).
220. Id. at 433-434 (noting that studies of board diversity could also indicate “1) that
more successful firms have greater resources to dedicate to the pursuit of board
diversity, 2) that more successful firms are under greater public scrutiny and pressure as
regards board diversity, or 3) that female and minority directors are scarce commodities
who can choose to serve only on the boards of more successful firms”).
221. Trautman, supra note 189, at 227.
222. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 763 (stating that “corporate
boards should be more diverse because it is the morally concrete outcome”).
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argument is premised on societal motivations including equal
opportunity and acknowledging the disproportionate obstacles that
select groups confront.223 As law professor Barbara Black has stated:
Given the poor performance of the boards of many leading financial
institutions during the recent financial crisis, it is hard to believe that
the presence of more women in the boardroom would have a
deleterious effect on risk-management oversight . . . . [A] business
justification for increased female representation on corporate boards
hardly seems necessary . . . . This is an issue of equal opportunity.224

Despite the appeal of this argument, it has limited value within the
shareholder primacy model of the corporate structure. 225 It can be
challenging to implement a diversity policy within a corporation if it has
not been sufficiently proven that board diversity positively impacts
corporate performance.226
Lissa Broome, head of University of North Carolina School of
Law’s Director Diversity Initiative, and Kimberly Krawiec, Katherine
Robinson Everett Professor of Law at Duke University, noted how a
diverse corporate board sends a signal to relevant observers of corporate
behavior. 227 Signaling is one party conveying to another party
information about itself that is important but not immediately
apparent. 228 Having a diverse board may enhance the corporate
reputation by signaling to shareholders and employees that the company
values gender diversity.229
Lisa M. Fairfax, co-director of the DirectWomen Board Institute
dedicated to promoting board diversity, believes that corporate boards
today will progressively react to shareholders’ concerns because of the
moral argument without needing to defend their actions through market
gain alone. 230 Fairfax compared promoting boardroom diversity to

223.
224.

Trautman, supra note 189, at 229.
Barbara Black, Stalled: Gender Diversity of Corporate Boards, 37 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 7, 20 (2011).
225. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 763.
226. Id.
227. See generally Broome & Krawiec, supra note 219.
228. Id. at 447-52.
229. Id.
230. Trautman, supra note 189, at 229.
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corporate charitable donations.231 Boards’ decisions to make charitable
contributions have been upheld by the courts as such acts promote the
corporation’s perception in society.232 Endorsing gender heterogeneity in
boardrooms for the company’s benefit may likewise boost the
corporation’s reputation.233
Board diversity combines alternate and complementary opinions,
experiences, and views for a deeper and more constructive dialogue.234
Combining different individuals’ contributions will likely lead to higher
quality decisions based on a broad range of perspectives than decisions
made in a groupthink environment. 235 By enabling a varied blend of
perspectives, diversity fosters the development of new products and
solutions.236
Despite the drawbacks typically associated with stereotypical
gender differences, the differences in personality may actually benefit
certain human relations issues.237 As one male director stated, “[W]omen

231.
232.

Id.; see also supra Section I.A.1 (discussing the charitable gift exception).
Trautman, supra note 189, at 229; e.g., A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98
A.2d 581 (1953). This is an exception to the shareholder primacy role. See supra
Section I.A.
233. Trautman, supra note 189, at 229.
234. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 778.
235. Id. at 779-780. In interviews, directors questioned whether boards would be
able to accomplish the agendas important to corporate America without diversity. Id. at
779. One director stated that most veteran male directors’ experiences involve “an old,
classic hierarchy of organization,” which is becoming outdated. Id.
236. PwC Study, supra note 66.
237. As Dr. Louann Brizendine explains,
In the brain centers for language and hearing, for example, women
have 11 percent more neurons than men. The principal hub of both
emotion and memory formation – the hippocampus – is also larger in
the female brain as is the brain circuitry for language and observing
emotions in others. . . . The female brain has tremendous unique
aptitudes – outstanding verbal agility, the ability to connect deeply in
friendship, a nearly psychic capacity to read faces and tone of voice
for emotions and states of mind, and the ability to defuse conflict.
All of this is hardwired into the brains of women. These are the
talents women are born with that many men, frankly, are not. Men
are born with other talents, shaped by their own hormonal reality . . .
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are a lot better [at] dealing with egos of other people than men are and
they’re a lot more patient and they’re a lot more team oriented,” while
men are more “competitive and . . . blustery.”238 Increasing women’s
presence in executive roles will also allow for better role models for
other women in the workplace. 239 Successful women help accelerate
progress toward gender equality as other women’s achievements help
motivate women in more junior positions.240
II. RECENT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DIVERSITY
A. STATE LAW INITIATIVES
There are no significant gender diversity obligations imposed by
corporate law at the state level. Delaware law, for instance, has no
stipulations regarding diversity of board candidates.241 There have been
some state level initiatives of a more voluntary nature, designed to
encourage women’s representation on boards. 242 Several states,
including Massachusetts, Illinois, and California, have recently passed
resolutions recommending the appointment of women to boards and
setting the minimum number of board positions that must be occupied
by women, depending on the board size. 243 For example, the Illinois
resolution sets guidelines for the number of women that public
corporations should appoint by 2018: boards with fewer than five
members should aim to have at least one woman; boards with five to
nine members should have at least two women; and boards with nine or

Caprino, supra note 157 (quoting LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 5-8
(2007)).
238. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 780.
239. A veteran female board member stressed that when she was an employee, the
existence of female board members was assuring and gave her a sense of comfort. Id. at
793.
240. Id. at 762 (noting that some directors were of the opinion that “diverse boards
aid in the recruitment, retention, and promotion of women and minorities, particularly
with succession issues in senior management”).
241. Remus Valsan, US Bill on Gender Diversity in the Boardroom, ECCLBLOG
(Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.ecclblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2016/04/22/us-bill-on-gender-diversi
ty-in-the-boardroom/ [https://perma.cc/GC8T-A267].
242. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 28.
243. Id.
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more members should have at least three women. 244 Illinois state
representative Michelle Mussman has stated, “As our work force
becomes more representative of our society, it is very important that
corporate leadership follows the same trend.”245 Other states, including
Pennsylvania, 246 New York, 247 and Virginia 248 have also joined this
movement. New York Representative Carolyn Maloney introduced the
Gender Diversity in Corporate Leadership Act in March 2016, which the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce endorsed. 249 This requires the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to release a yearly report on the
gender diversity of boards, and further mandates that public companies
recount the gender of board members and board candidates in the same
fashion that they disclose name, age, and credentials.250 It further calls
for the establishment of an SEC Advisory Group to describe approaches
and make suggestions for ways companies can grow the female presence
on their boards.251

244.
245.

H.R. Res. 439, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ill. 2015).
Michelle Mussman, Mussman Passes Resolution for Gender Diversity on
Corporate Boards, CHI. TRIB. (June 10, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/
arlington-heights/community/chi-ugc-article-mussman-passes-resolution-for-gender-div
ersit-2015-06-10-story.html [http://perma.cc/5ZSE-HQQQ].
246. Mayor Nutter Signs Councilwoman Blondell Reynolds Brown’s “Women on
Corporate Boards” Bill-#130457, PHILA. CITY COUNCIL (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://phlcouncil.com/mayor-nutter-signs-councilwoman-blondell-reynolds-browns-wo
men-on-corporate-boards-bill-130457/ [https://perma.cc/8CWN-GFCD].
247. Maloney Press Release, supra note 70.
248. A House Resolution encouraging gender diversity in corporate boards was
sponsored by a representative from Virginia. H.R. Res. 445, 114th Cong. (2015).
249. Maloney Press Release, supra note 70; see also H.R. 4718, 114th Cong.
(2016).
250. Maloney Press Release, supra note 70.
251. Id.

2017]

BRINGING TALENT OFF THE BENCH
AND INTO THE GAME

243

B. FEDERAL LAW
1. SEC Disclosure Law
Prior to 2010, there was a notable absence of laws and regulations
that addressed gender diversity.252 Given the absence of state and federal
action on this issue, the SEC took initiative to address the lack of
women on boards.253 Through a release in 2009, the SEC sought input
from investors and other market participants about diversity in the
boardroom. 254 In response to its proposal, the SEC was flooded with
letters, 90% of which endorsed company disclosure relating to
boardroom diversity.255 Given that these letters came from individuals
and organizations that represent over $3 trillion in resources, there is a
prevailing sentiment that evidence of diversity is a crucial factor for
company valuation.256
Keeping in mind the public interest and the needs of investors, the
SEC adopted a rule that added a disclosure component to the nomination
process.257 The rule was a part of Regulation S-K, which is a set of rules
developed by the SEC that sets forth detailed disclosure requirements
for various SEC filings used by public companies. 258 Specifically,
companies must now disclose whether they consider diversity in the
nomination process, how diversity is considered, and how effective they
deem their policy.259 These Proxy Disclosure Enhancements went into
252. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS–LIMITS TO THE
BUSINESS RATIONALE AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SUPPORTING RATIONALES AND
THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE OF THE LAW 7 (2011).
253. Id.
254. Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, Securities Act Release No.
9052, Exchange Act Release No. 60,280, Investment Company Act Release No.
28,817, 74 Fed Reg. 35,076 (proposed July 17, 2009).
255. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Diversity in the Boardroom
Is Important and, Unfortunately, Still Rare (Sept. 16, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2010/spch091610laa.htm [https://perma.cc/JYE2-PWXS].
256. Id.
257. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2016).
258. Regulation S-K requires public companies to disclose the specifics of their
business operations, including but not limited to a description of their business, their
securities, financial information, specifics of management positions, qualifications,
salary, the corporate governance structure, etc. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2016).
259. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 6.
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effect on February 28, 2010 260 and “provide investors with important
information about companies’ financial condition and business practices
for making informed investment and voting decisions.”261
Although the disclosure rule is a step in the right direction, many
have questioned the rule’s efficacy. Former Chair of the SEC, Mary Jo
White, has said that many investors want to learn about the gender
diversity of boards and it is debatable whether existing laws are truly
providing the requisite information to them.262
The primary concern with the law is its inconsistent interpretation.
This stems from the SEC’s failure to define diversity, and its decision to
instead allow companies to define it “in ways that they consider
appropriate.” 263 Since diversity encompasses different things, a wide
range of factors could fall under the umbrella of diversity. 264 A
candidate may be considered diverse based on educational background,
interests, professional experiences, individual qualities, differences in
viewpoint, or based on age, race, gender, and ethnicity.265 In fact, an
analysis of the proxy statements of the S&P 100 companies found that
when interpreting diversity, most companies “define diversity with
reference to a director’s prior experience or other nonidentity-based
factors rather than his or her socio-demographic characteristics.” 266
More than 80% of the companies considered background and experience
as sources of diversity, while only about half defined diversity in terms
of gender, race, and ethnicity. 267 In a recent petition to the SEC to
260. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, Exchange
Act Release No. 61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 97 SEC Docket
1382 (Dec. 16, 2009).
261. Id.
262. Molly Petrilla, The SEC Wants New Rules for Board Diversity—Here’s Why
That Matters, FORTUNE: MOST POWERFUL WOMEN (Jan. 29, 2016, 2:29 PM),
http://fortune.com/2016/01/29/sec-rules-board-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/KV6Y-YJ
KY].
263. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, Exchange
Act Release No. 61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 97 SEC Docket
1382 (Dec. 16, 2009).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Elizabeth Olson, New Paper Finds Fuzzy Definitions for Board Diversity, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/newpaper-finds-fuzzy-definitions-for-board-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/NJZ8-EM3L].
267. Id.
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improve board nominee disclosure, a group of public fund fiduciaries
supervising $1 trillion worth of assets stated that the lack of guidance on
how diversity is defined and companies’ varying interpretations of the
term fail to capture any information in a manner that would be relevant
to investors.268
The rule does not require companies to disclose diversity statistics
and its vagueness allows companies to share very little.269 Companies
can consider diversity in any way that suits them, and they are free to
exclude gender altogether from this calculation.270 Companies can even
report that they do not have a diversity policy and still be in compliance
with the law.271 As a result of diversity’s ambiguous definition and the
fact that the rule is more suggestive than compulsory, the envisioned
change has yet to take effect despite the SEC’s efforts.
2. Dodd-Frank Act
Congress has emphasized the fact that financial regulators should
be spearheading efforts to recruit employees from divergent
backgrounds.272 Specifically, there is a clear instruction in Section 342
of the Dodd-Frank Act for the SEC to launch an Office of Minority and
Women Inclusion (“OMWI”) that would handle “all matters of the
agency relating to diversity in management, employment, and business

268. ANNE SIMPSON ET AL., PETITION FOR AMENDMENT OF PROXY RULE REGARDING
BOARD NOMINEE DISCLOSURE–CHART / MATRIX APPROACH 1 n. 2 (2015), https://www.
sec.gov/rules/petitions/2015/petn4-682.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HHH-ZZHV].
269. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address, International
Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference: Focusing the Lens of Disclosure
to Set the Path Forward on Board Diversity, Non-GAAP, and Sustainability (June 27,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-icgn-speech.html [https://perma.c
c/LPL2-2ZCH].
270. Id.
271. Melissa Blechman, leader of the 30% Club, stated that “the critical part here is
the SEC does not define diversity, and companies can simply comply with the rule by
saying they don’t have a diversity policy.” Jena McGregor, A New Push Begins to Get
More Women on Corporate Boards, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.latimes.co
m/business/la-fi-on-leadership-women-boards-20160114-story.html [http://perma.cc/62
A7-G92W].
272. Aguilar, supra note 255.
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activities.” 273 This law permits the SEC to take action to increase
diversity in the workforce. The statute permits the OMWI to create
standards for “assessing diversity policies and practices of regulated
entities,” “increased participation of minority-owned and women-owned
businesses in programs and contracts of the agency,” and “equal
employment opportunity and racial, gender, and ethnic diversity of
workforce and senior management.” 274 Even though OMWI’s new
employs are marginally more diverse than preceding hires, the 2012 to
2015 data exposes the persistent lack of diversity in the workplace.275
C. OTHER U.S. EFFORTS
To increase visibility of qualified candidates, organizations have
created databases of qualified women ready to be appointed on company
boards. Global Board Ready Women is one of the most prominent
initiatives, and other projects include Diversity in Boardrooms, Stanford
Women on Board Initiative, and WomenCorporateDirectors
Foundation. 276 Organizations such as 2020 Women on Boards and

273. Id.; see also About the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (June 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/omwi/about-omwi [http://perma.cc/7LG
D-2ZK8].
274. Aguilar, supra note 255.
275. NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF MINORITY & WOMEN
INCLUSION CONGRESSIONAL REPORT 2015, https://www.ncua.gov/About/leadership/Pag
es/minority-women-inclusion/documents/2015-omwi-congressional-report.pdf [http://p
erma.cc/4CXK-93KF].
276. DIVERSITY IN BOARDROOMS, http://www.diversityinboardrooms.com [http://per
ma.cc/ZXV4-D49M] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016); Stanford Women on Boards
Initiative, STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/al
umni/communities/gsb-women/stanford-women-boards-initiative [https://perma.cc/2JT
G-JXZ9] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016); WOMEN CORPORATE DIRECTORS FOUND,
http://www.womencorporatedirectors.com [http://perma.cc/8GEN-SJB4] (last visited
Sept. 26, 2016).
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Diversity Inc. publish diversity indexes, 277 while other organizations
have created diversity awards to encourage board diversity.278
In recent years, investors have initiated their own efforts to improve
gender diversity. 279 Investors have zeroed in on corporations’
environmental, social, and governance practices (“ESG”) as “corporate
investment in ESG enhances a company’s performance and reputation,
fosters revenue growth, and represents an avenue for shareholder
engagement.” 280 Since gender diversity plays a crucial part in ESG
practices, investors have begun to prioritize it accordingly. 281 One
example of such efforts is the Thirty Percent Coalition founded in 2011,
which aims to have women represent 30% of U.S. public companies’
boards.282 As a result of its efforts, a female director has been elected at
over 100 companies that were previously governed by all-male
boards. 283 Another investor-led effort is State Street Global Advisors,
which manages an exchange-traded fund that invests in U.S. companies
with the highest levels of gender diversity in their sectors.284

277. Boardroom Diversity: When Women Lead, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS,
https://www.2020wob.com/companies/2020-gender-diversity-index [http://perma.cc/F7
5L-X8N3] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016); The 2016 DiversityINC Top 50 Companies for
Diversity, DIVERSITY INC., http://www.diversityinc.com/the-diversityinc-top-50companies-for-diversity-2016/ [http://perma.cc/PL4E-HHED] (last visited Sept. 26,
2016).
278. See, e.g., Catalyst Award, CATALYST, http://www.catalyst.org/catalyst-award
[https://perma.cc/TW28-DUG3] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
279. See, e.g., 21ST CENTURY ENGAGEMENT: INVESTOR STRATEGIES FOR
INCORPORATING ESG CONSIDERATIONS INTO CORPORATE INTERACTIONS, BLACKROCK
(2015), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/publication/blk-ceresengagementguide2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/S66D-XKSG].
280. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 28.
281. Id.
282. The Coalition is comprised of private equity, public companies, institutional
investors, professional service firms, national women’s organizations, and government
officials. Who We Are, THIRTY PERCENT COALITION, http://www.30percentcoalition.org
/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/R63Q-A8CA] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
283. Id.
284. The fund is called the SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF, and it trades
with the ticker symbol SHE. SHE, ETF.COM, http://www.etf.com/SHE [https://perma.cc
/VKL4-XJDN] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
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D. GLOBAL APPROACH
Countries around the world have taken measures to address gender
diversity in corporate boardrooms. Some have taken a strong approach
by enforcing mandatory quotas. Norway requires at least 40% of board
seats to be allocated for women depending on the size of the board, Italy
has a 33% quota, Malaysia instituted a 30% quota for new
appointments, and Israel and India require at least one woman on the
board. 285 Other countries have taken more voluntary approaches,
including setting goals for women’s representation, which typically fall
between 20% and 40%.286
III. WAYS TO INCREASE WOMEN ON BOARDS
Women’s low representation on boards is a multifaceted problem
that requires a multifaceted solution. In addition to supporting initiatives
already underway, board diversity could be encouraged through proxy
access and amendments of disclosure laws. Furthermore, women should
be encouraged to be proactive about their careers, but companies should
still play their part to enable women’s success.
A. SHAREHOLDER PROXY ACCESS RULES
Shareholder voting allows shareholders to remedy mistakes by the
board of directors through the nomination and election of new
candidates for the board. However, direct shareholder voting in the
context of the modern corporation would be complex and inefficient due
to the number of shareholders and geographically dispersed ownership.
The proxy process, whereby shareholders sign a proxy card, which
authorizes an aggregating intermediary to vote the stakeholders’ shares
in favor of a particular director (or for some other corporate action), is a
way to simplify the process. Proxy access, i.e., the ability of
shareholders to include director nominees in the company’s proxy
material, is a way for shareholders to nominate or recommend specific

285. See LINDA-ELING LEE ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARDS: GLOBAL TRENDS IN GENDER
DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS 24 (2015), https://www.msci.com/documents/1019
9/04b6f646-d638-4878-9c61-4eb91748a82b [https://perma.cc/7XWU-3A9P].
286. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 28, at 3.
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candidates for directorship roles.287 The proxy process, in essence, is one
of the primary ways by which shareholders are able to participate in
corporate governance and company meetings without a physical
presence.288
The proxy process, however, has had the opposite effect of its
intended purpose as, in practice, it weakens shareholders’ ability to
nominate and elect directors by rendering it increasingly more difficult
to unseat incumbent directors.289 Although in theory shareholders have
the right to nominate directors, their approval is mostly seen as a
“rubber stamp process of affirmation,” given the tremendous costs and
administrative burdens associated with the initiation of a challenge
through proxy.290
The SEC’s Rule 14a-8 is the mechanism that protects shareholders’
rights to vote in director elections by allowing their proposal to be
placed beside management’s proposals in the proxy materials of a
corporation. 291 While the rule used to permit the exclusion of
shareholders’ director proposals, the SEC amended the rule in 2012; a
company can no longer exclude a proposal purely because it relates to
the nomination or election of directors. 292 Under the amended rule,
companies can still exclude shareholder proposals for director elections

287. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, PROXY ACCESS: BEST PRACTICES 2 (2015),
http://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/08_05_15_Best%20Practices%20-%20Proxy
%20Access.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8EY-U2LC].
288. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
289. E-mail from James McRitchie, Publisher, CorpGov.net, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comment
s/s7-10-09/s71009-307.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4RQ-458T].
290. Id.
291. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,828, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682 (proposed
Sept. 26, 1997).
292. William P. Mills, III & Braden K. McCurrach, United States: Recent
Amendments to Rule 14a-8 and the Implications for the 2012, MONDAQ (Oct. 4, 2011),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/147604/Securities/Recent+Amendments+To+R
ule+14a8+And+The+Implications+For+The+2012 [https://perma.cc/MUF7-8C3W];
see e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)-(v) (2016) (listing the five reasons companies may
exclude shareholder proposals).
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under certain specified scenarios (e.g., if the proposal would remove a
director prior to the expiration of his term).293
Shareholders should use proxy access to increase boardroom
diversity. In particular, shareholders should propose an amendment of
the company’s bylaws pursuant to Rule 14a-8 to require the board of
directors and other relevant stakeholders to consider gender diversity in
the recruitment of senior management and director nominees.
In 2013, the New York City comptroller, Scott Stringer, as
investment adviser to the New York City Pension Funds retirement
system, launched the Boardroom Accountability Project. The purpose of
the program was to establish a “more diverse, independent and
accountable” board of directors at U.S. public companies through proxy
access. 294 His leading action involved submitting proxy access
shareowner proposals to seventy-five companies in 2015.295 One such
proposal filed with C.F. Industries Holdings Inc. asked the board of
directors to broaden its recruitment efforts to include women and
minorities, and to notify the shareholders of any attempts to increase
diversity.296 Additionally, BlackRock Inc. revised its guidelines to resist
the reappointment of board members who paid “insufficient attention to
board diversity.” 297 As of 2015, over 100 U.S. companies have
293. Companies do not need to include the shareholders proxy proposal however, if
it violates a substantive or procedural component of the rule. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)
(2016); DAVID M. LYNN & ANNA T. PINEDO, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND PROXY ACCESS 1 (2015), http://media.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/Frequently-Asked-Questions-about-Shareholder-Proposals-and-ProxyAccess.pdf [http://perma.cc/2RL9-PCSS]. If a component of the rule is violated, the
company is required to notify the SEC, typically by asking for a “no-action letter.”
LYNN & PINEDO, supra, at 1.
294. OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, NEW YORK CITY
PENSION FUNDS: 2015 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES POSTSEASON REPORT 4 (2015), http://
comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/NYCRS_Shareowner_Initiatives__2015_Postseason_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/82KT-3PAQ].
295. Id.
296. SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 268.
297. Michelle Edkins, BlackRock’s global head of corporate governance and
responsible investment, remarked, “Our updates to the U.S. guidelines reflect our
engagements with companies over the past couple of years and our evolving
expectations of public company boards and directors.” Joann Lublin, BlackRock
Toughens Stance on Boards, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
blackrock-to-take-tougher-stance-on-u-s-corporate-directors-1425414807 [http://perma.
cc/6MLS-FQME].
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supported proxy access bylaws that are in line with the NYC Funds’
conditions.298
B. SELF-HELP FOR WOMEN
For the first time in the history of the U.S., the number of single
women is higher than that of married women.299 The rise of independent
women marks the start of a new kind of identity for the American
woman. History serves as a reminder that the driving force behind
significant milestones for women’s rights are, in fact, women.300 In the
nineteenth century, single women, including Susan B. Anthony, Jane
Addams, Alice Paul, and Elizabeth Blackwell led the fight for suffrage
and abolition, were leaders in the field of medicine, and founded
women’s colleges.301 Women in the late twentieth century led the sexual
revolution and women’s rights movements, resulting in positive legal
and social changes for women.302 The rise of single women has changed
the shape of families, and women’s participation in the workforce means
that legislation must adapt to this change to address the realities of
modern life. Single women rightfully demand equal pay, family leave,
increased minimum wage, universal pre-K, reduced college costs,
reasonable healthcare costs, and reproductive freedom. 303 A set of
strategies that would permit women to devote time to both their careers
and their families would help women attain senior positions 304 and
compete on an equal footing with men. To enable a company to flourish,
companies must relinquish the economic and social systems that
encourage stereotypical categorization of males and females alike.
However, the extent to which women will have an impact depends on
women recognizing that they have political power and stepping up to
exercise it and call for change.

298.
299.

OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 294.
This can be attributed to the “disestablishment of marriage,” which women
today are widely embracing. In 2009, less than 50% of women were married. See
generally Traister, supra note 116.
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. See generally id.
304. Victor, supra note 209.
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Aspiring women must be outspoken and understand the steps
necessary to achieve their goals. In order to close the gender gap at the
top, women need to eliminate the internal barriers that exist within
themselves by “leaning in,” in the words of Sheryl Sandberg, and
creating careers that soar. 305 Women must focus on expanding and
proving their abilities, their grasp of the industries, and their roles in
reaching these goals, i.e., their “positional purpose.”306
C. COMPANY EFFORTS
Although women need to be reminded to reach for the top and
remove internal barriers, this does not take the onus off of companies.
Women can only get to the top when institutional barriers are removed.
As Colantuono has stated:
[W]e don’t want to put 100 percent of the responsibility on women’s
shoulders, nor would it be wise to do so, and here’s why: In order for
companies to achieve their strategic financial goals, executives
understand that they have to have everyone pulling in the same
direction. In other words, the term we use in business is we have to
have strategic alignment.307

Despite the fact that executives are familiar with this concept, 63% of
companies lack it, which in turn means that these organizations are not
guaranteed to hit their financial targets.308 Businesses, therefore, should
take steps and develop initiatives to support gender diversity. By
moving more women into high visibility roles, women will also have
greater access to mentors and sponsors throughout their careers.309
305.
306.

See generally SANDBERG, supra note 1.
Colantuono, supra note 155; Susan L. Colantuono, There Are 3 Keys to Career
Success–But Women Are Only Taught 2 of Them, MOTTO (Feb. 4, 2016), http://motto.
time.com/4167912/career-advice-women/ [https://perma.cc/6ZMY-ZEWL].
307. Colantuono, supra note 155.
308. Id.
309. For example, L’Oréal is one such organization that has a suite of programs
aimed at boosting women’s progress. The company hosts an annual retreat for females
and also has a grant program focused on women in science. See L’Oréal USA for
Women in Science, L’ORÉAL USA, http://www.lorealusa.com/csr-commitments/thel%E2%80%99or%C3%A9al-corporate-foundation/science/l%E2%80%99or%C3%A9
al-usa-for-women-in-science-program [https://perma.cc/D52G-J8NC] (last visited Mar.
6, 2017); Kate Dingwall, L’Oréal, P&G Voted Top Work Place for Women, FASHION
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Companies should develop formalized recruiting efforts and ensure
they have nominating committees filled with a majority of outside
directors.310 More outreach should be encouraged in recruiting efforts,
and companies should expand their search beyond the standard pool of
candidates. In an effort to “dispel the myth that the underrepresentation
of women on corporate boards is a supply problem,” Catalyst is
generating a catalog of female candidates who are prepared to be board
members and already have the CEO stamp of approval.311 Nominating
committees should take advantage of databases—developed by
organizations such as Catalyst— of board-qualified female candidates.
Companies should create a culture of inclusion, which welcomes,
values, and leverages the benefits of diversity, thereby enabling women
to grow. This can be accomplished through organizing seminars,
keynotes, speakers, or panels on the barriers women face, and spreading
awareness of the underlying cultural factors that are impediments to
women’s success in the workplace. Such programs can signal to
employees that gender diversity is an important policy on the company’s
agenda. It is imperative that companies engage all employees, male and
female, in their inclusion initiatives. To date, diversity programs are
commonly absorbed with emboldening the minority crowd or educating
the majority crowd about their prejudices.312 However, the two are not
mutually exclusive. Effective and responsible leadership entails
including “100% of the target audience.”313
Corporations need to provide across-the-board recognition of the
importance of raising children and preserving families. This vital work
currently results in professional demotion instead of being rewarded for
NETWORK (Mar. 1, 2017), http://us.fashionnetwork.com/news/L-Oreal-P-G-voted-topwork-place-for-women,798897.html#.WLnPUhIrLGI [https://perma.cc/6FW8-3TG2]
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
310. It is important to note that this is already required by many companies, such as
those listed on the NYSE. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
311. The list is expected to launch in 2017. Laura Cohn, Exclusive: Airbnb, P&G,
and Unilever Are Partnering with the Clinton Foundation to Invest over $70m in
Women, FORTUNE: MOST POWERFUL WOMEN (Sept. 20, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/
09/20/chelsea-clinton-no-ceilings-clinton-global-initiative/ [http://perma.cc/8MFA-HZ
KX].
312. Avivah Wittenberg Cox, Corporate Diversity Initiatives Should Include White
Men, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/09/corporate-diversityinitiatives-should-include-white-men [http://perma.cc/PH9S-6NSS].
313. Id.
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its importance. 314 Appropriate acknowledgment of the challenges of
child-rearing would resolve the inconsistencies between the hopeful
advice given to women and the harsh realities of the workplace.315 One
avenue companies can take is to provide coaching to new parents. The
consulting firms Life Meets Work and Talking Talent are dedicated to
training and instructing employers, and in some large companies,
especially where employees have demanding work schedules,
employees have started using such services. 316 The coaching sessions
can be done in-person, over the phone or through the web, and can be
done individually or in group sessions. The goal of such coaching is to
help parents manage their work and home responsibilities, set
boundaries, prioritize their tasks, and facilitate their transition to
parental leave.317 Companies that offer these benefits include MetLife,
Deutsche Bank, Etsy, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Grant Thornton. By
providing such services, companies are showing employees that they are
supportive and that they are taking active steps to change the work
culture.318
Another avenue companies can use to both retain women and
recognize parenting challenges is to change the emphasis on face time in
the office.319 The expectation in many industries today is that it is a core
part of the job to arrive at the office early, leave late, and work on
weekends. While the pendulum has undoubtedly swung too far toward
too many hours spent in the office, there is still value (e.g., informal
sharing of ideas or cross-pollination of views from various departments)
in employees working in a communal area. However, with today’s
technological advances, employees should not be compelled to remain
in the office all hours of the night when the same work can be done
remotely. If a parent can periodically leave the office early to see to their
child rearing responsibilities, it would create a culture more
314.
315.
316.

See generally CRITTENDEN, supra note 102; Traister, supra note 116.
CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 10.
Tara Siegel Bernard, Why Companies Have Started to Coach New Parents,
N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/your-money/whycompanies-have-started-to-coach-new-parents.html [https://perma.cc/5N8L-DTXK].
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, ATLANTIC
(July/August 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-wome
n-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/ [https://perma.cc/ZE9G-ZWQA].
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accommodating to working parents. This workplace flexibility would
not only benefit working parents, but would also likely produce more
satisfied and productive employees.
D. DISCLOSURE
Many of the barriers to women’s representation relate to the
policies and practices within the corporation itself. Compelled
disclosure with respect to these topics would allow shareholders to
better scrutinize the environment for diversity within a corporation.
Specifically, Regulation S-K should be amended to require greater
disclosure with respect to (i) the director nomination and election
process, and (ii) the company’s policies and efforts regarding gender
diversity. Regarding the director nomination procedures, SEC disclosure
requirements should be amended to define diversity more specifically,
e.g., to include gender, race, and ethnicity rather than just allowing
companies to interpret diversity however they please.320 The SEC should
also create a universal template that every public company would be
required to use to present the qualifications of director candidates. 321
According to Regulation S-K, companies are required to disclose their
processes for evaluating nominees for director positions, but they are not
required to have a diversity policy. 322 If companies do not have a
diversity policy, they should be required to disclose such information
and the underlying reason as well. Additionally, companies should be
required to disclose the information they consider during the nomination
process. This would hopefully encourage boards (or their nominating
committees) to look at different sources and organizations that have
already put in the effort to find qualified women to serve on boards.323
320. Letter from Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Advisory Comm. on Small & Emerging
Cos. To Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Dec. 2016), https://www.sec.
gov/info/smallbus/acsec-board-diversity-recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/45PE-Z
ZCC].
321. COUNCIL OF INSTITITIONAL INV’RS, BEST DISCLOSURE: DIRECTOR
QUALIFICATIONS & SKILLS (2014), http://www.cii.org/files/publications/governance_ba
sics/04_28_14_best_disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM5Y-Z2A9].
322. If the company has a diversity policy, then the rule requires that they “describe
how this policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the
board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2016).
323. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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While diversity in the composition of a company’s board is crucial,
companies should also have policies that are designed to promote
diversity among management and employees. Many companies have
handbooks or information online regarding their business operations and
policies, but currently, there is limited information that is required to be
included in the material. Companies should be compelled to disclose
narrative descriptions of (1) maternity, paternity, and child care policies
(“Familial-Related Policies”); (2) the number of men and women at each
level utilizing the Familial-Related Policies; and (3) the number of men
and women at each level of management. The aim of these disclosures is
to remedy the issue of women’s low retention rates and their absence in
the higher ranks of corporations. By coercing companies to make these
disclosures, directors and shareholders will be obligated to pay closer
attention to the current landscape of the workplace and remedy the
obstacles in women’s paths to board positions.
CONCLUSION
Women have made great progress in the boardroom over the past
four decades. This has enabled a new type of conversation—not one
focused merely on getting women in the door, but on closing the gap at
the top. There are real barriers that women face: prerequisite
qualifications, the lack of workplace flexibility in adapting to parenting
needs, the male dominated culture in the boardroom, gender behavioral
disparities, the differences in guidance and mentorship for females and
males, and the general desire to maintain a certain corporate culture.
These obstacles are tangible and must be acknowledged and remedied.
These issues could be remedied through enhancements to the proxy
process and company disclosure requirements. By requiring companies
to provide the necessary information and context regarding diversity and
by improving the voting process, stockholders will have the knowledge
and ability to effectuate change. While women need to step up,
companies and shareholders do as well, and should take steps to adopt
policies that encourage women’s development and inclusion in the
workforce and on boards.

